Source: Daniel Davis youtube
Showing posts with label Lt Col Daniel Davis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lt Col Daniel Davis. Show all posts
Larry C. Johnson | U.S. at WAR with IRAN, IRANIAN LEADER DEAD! | Feb. 28, 2026
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China,
Iran,
Israel,
Larry C. Johnson,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
Russia,
Trump
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Col. Douglas Macgregor | GET READY, Iran Will Not Fall Like a House of Cards | Feb. 25, 2026
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China,
Colonel Douglas Macgregor,
Iran,
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Lt Col Daniel Davis,
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Col. Douglas Macgregor | BOMBING IRAN Won't Fix Anything | Feb. 17, 2026
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China,
Colonel Douglas Macgregor,
Iran,
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Lt Col Daniel Davis,
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Source: Daniel Davis youtube
Description:
U.S. military leaders are confident in their capabilities against Iran, but any war would likely involve American losses in the air, on the ground, and possibly at sea.
Senator Lindsey Graham is portrayed as accepting those risks, arguing military action is justified despite potential U.S. casualties. The speaker strongly disagrees, arguing there is no compelling U.S. national security reason to attack Iran and that such a war would provoke Iranian retaliation and American deaths.
Col Douglas Macgregor claims some policymakers and commentators view U.S. and Israeli interests as identical, but argues the U.S. has no strategic interest in destroying Iran or its society.
He rejects the idea that Iranians would welcome U.S. military intervention, arguing bombing Iran would not help its population or lead to regime change.
The speaker disputes claims that Iran poses a global threat or is actively pursuing nuclear weapons, arguing Iran’s actions are primarily defensive or regional rather than aimed at world domination.
He criticizes Western media and neoconservative voices, including Mark Thiessen, for promoting war and framing negotiations as requiring Iran’s surrender.
He argues negotiations are unlikely to succeed because U.S. demands—such as ending enrichment, missile programs, and regional influence—are unacceptable to Iran.
He concludes that U.S. policy toward Iran is heavily influenced by Israeli strategic priorities and broader geopolitical and financial power struggles, making compromise unlikely and increasing the risk of conflict.
Overall: The speaker argues that war with Iran would be costly, unnecessary for U.S. security, unlikely to achieve its goals, and driven more by ideology and alliances than by clear American interests.
Description:
U.S. military leaders are confident in their capabilities against Iran, but any war would likely involve American losses in the air, on the ground, and possibly at sea.
Senator Lindsey Graham is portrayed as accepting those risks, arguing military action is justified despite potential U.S. casualties. The speaker strongly disagrees, arguing there is no compelling U.S. national security reason to attack Iran and that such a war would provoke Iranian retaliation and American deaths.
Col Douglas Macgregor claims some policymakers and commentators view U.S. and Israeli interests as identical, but argues the U.S. has no strategic interest in destroying Iran or its society.
He rejects the idea that Iranians would welcome U.S. military intervention, arguing bombing Iran would not help its population or lead to regime change.
The speaker disputes claims that Iran poses a global threat or is actively pursuing nuclear weapons, arguing Iran’s actions are primarily defensive or regional rather than aimed at world domination.
He criticizes Western media and neoconservative voices, including Mark Thiessen, for promoting war and framing negotiations as requiring Iran’s surrender.
He argues negotiations are unlikely to succeed because U.S. demands—such as ending enrichment, missile programs, and regional influence—are unacceptable to Iran.
He concludes that U.S. policy toward Iran is heavily influenced by Israeli strategic priorities and broader geopolitical and financial power struggles, making compromise unlikely and increasing the risk of conflict.
Overall: The speaker argues that war with Iran would be costly, unnecessary for U.S. security, unlikely to achieve its goals, and driven more by ideology and alliances than by clear American interests.
Col. Douglas Macgregor | What if IRAN's MISSILE DEFENSE WORKS? | Feb. 10, 2026
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China,
Colonel Douglas Macgregor,
Iran,
Israel,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
Russia,
Trump
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Source: Daniel Davis youtube
Description:
The discussion examines a potential U.S.–Israel military campaign against Iran, emphasizing that this scenario is fundamentally different from past limited strikes. From the Iranian perspective, previous attacks were framed as narrow and restrained; this time, signals suggest a broader campaign aimed at regime collapse or even state disintegration. That shift would dramatically change Iran’s calculations and response.
The speaker argues that air campaigns alone rarely achieve decisive political outcomes. Historical examples—World War II bombing, Kosovo in 1999, and Serbia’s resilient air defenses—show that even prolonged, intensive air operations struggle to neutralize defenses or force capitulation without political or diplomatic leverage. Applied to Iran, this raises serious doubts about expectations of a short or clean operation.
Iran’s defensive capabilities are now significantly stronger than in the past. In addition to Russian systems like the S-300, Iran has integrated advanced Chinese HQ-9B long-range air defense systems, reportedly capable of engaging stealth aircraft and resisting electronic countermeasures. Even if these systems are only 70–80% effective, they could impose meaningful losses on attacking forces.
More importantly, Iran now has substantial offensive capabilities. Unlike Serbia in 1999, Iran can strike back with a large ballistic missile arsenal. If attacked, Iranian leaders have clearly stated they would respond without restraint—targeting U.S. bases, radar sites, command-and-control hubs, ships at sea, and Israel. Aircraft carriers and naval assets do not need to be sunk to be neutralized; even limited damage could render them ineffective and politically shocking.
The discussion stresses that what some planners assume would be a brief 10–14 day operation could stretch much longer, while the U.S. and its allies may face serious constraints on missile inventories and resupply. Precision missiles are complex and slow to produce, and current stockpiles may be closer to depletion than publicly acknowledged.
Although some military and political figures publicly advocate the military option as the “best” path to regime collapse, the speaker argues that this view understates the risks. A sustained campaign would likely involve massive strikes in the first 24 hours, followed by prolonged escalation in which Iran may outlast Western missile supplies.
The conclusion is stark: this would be a high-risk operation with unpredictable consequences, likely involving widespread regional damage, heavy retaliation, and escalation across all conventional means short of nuclear weapons. Historical caution—such as Eisenhower’s rejection of escalation in Korea—is offered as a reminder that wars intended to be decisive and controlled often become long, costly, and uncontrollable.
Description:
The discussion examines a potential U.S.–Israel military campaign against Iran, emphasizing that this scenario is fundamentally different from past limited strikes. From the Iranian perspective, previous attacks were framed as narrow and restrained; this time, signals suggest a broader campaign aimed at regime collapse or even state disintegration. That shift would dramatically change Iran’s calculations and response.
The speaker argues that air campaigns alone rarely achieve decisive political outcomes. Historical examples—World War II bombing, Kosovo in 1999, and Serbia’s resilient air defenses—show that even prolonged, intensive air operations struggle to neutralize defenses or force capitulation without political or diplomatic leverage. Applied to Iran, this raises serious doubts about expectations of a short or clean operation.
Iran’s defensive capabilities are now significantly stronger than in the past. In addition to Russian systems like the S-300, Iran has integrated advanced Chinese HQ-9B long-range air defense systems, reportedly capable of engaging stealth aircraft and resisting electronic countermeasures. Even if these systems are only 70–80% effective, they could impose meaningful losses on attacking forces.
More importantly, Iran now has substantial offensive capabilities. Unlike Serbia in 1999, Iran can strike back with a large ballistic missile arsenal. If attacked, Iranian leaders have clearly stated they would respond without restraint—targeting U.S. bases, radar sites, command-and-control hubs, ships at sea, and Israel. Aircraft carriers and naval assets do not need to be sunk to be neutralized; even limited damage could render them ineffective and politically shocking.
The discussion stresses that what some planners assume would be a brief 10–14 day operation could stretch much longer, while the U.S. and its allies may face serious constraints on missile inventories and resupply. Precision missiles are complex and slow to produce, and current stockpiles may be closer to depletion than publicly acknowledged.
Although some military and political figures publicly advocate the military option as the “best” path to regime collapse, the speaker argues that this view understates the risks. A sustained campaign would likely involve massive strikes in the first 24 hours, followed by prolonged escalation in which Iran may outlast Western missile supplies.
The conclusion is stark: this would be a high-risk operation with unpredictable consequences, likely involving widespread regional damage, heavy retaliation, and escalation across all conventional means short of nuclear weapons. Historical caution—such as Eisenhower’s rejection of escalation in Korea—is offered as a reminder that wars intended to be decisive and controlled often become long, costly, and uncontrollable.
Larry Johnson | Russia Doing Exactly What They Said They'd Do | Feb. 4, 2026
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China,
Iran,
Israel,
Larry Johnson,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
Russia,
Trump,
Ukraine
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Andrei Martyanov & Lt Col Daniel Davis | U.S. Overestimating Our Military Capabilities | Feb. 2, 2026
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Andrei Martyanov,
China,
Iran,
Israel,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
NATO,
Russia,
Trump
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Source: Daniel Davis youtube
Description:
Andrei Martyanov argues that Russia has shifted decisively toward a strategy of breaking Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war, not through rapid territorial advances but by systematically destroying critical infrastructure—especially energy and power generation. Around 70% of Ukraine’s thermal power capacity is described as destroyed, pushing the country toward economic collapse and the risk of humanitarian catastrophe. This escalation is framed as deliberate and long-planned, driven by Russian frustration after years of negotiations that, in their view, Europe rejected.
Militarily, Russia is portrayed as advancing slowly and cautiously on the front lines while applying overwhelming pressure at the strategic and economic level. Russian forces are said to be within roughly 10–11 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia, a major industrial city, but Moscow is deliberately avoiding large, risky breakthroughs. Instead, Russia is conserving forces, building reserves, and operating under an “economy of force” approach, with an eye not only on Ukraine but on potential future confrontation with NATO.
According to the speaker, Russia’s core objective is not territory but the physical destruction of Ukraine’s armed forces and the remnants of its military-industrial complex, including NATO-supplied equipment. The destruction of energy infrastructure is framed as a means to eliminate Ukraine’s war-making capacity rather than simply to punish civilians.
On negotiations, the speaker is emphatic that Russia is not bargaining. Russian goals—demilitarization, “denazification,” no NATO troops, and acceptance of Russian conditions—have not changed since mid-2024. Talks are characterized as ultimatums rather than compromise, with Russian officials signaling “our way or the highway.”
Europe is described as the main obstacle to ending the war, allegedly clinging to unrealistic demands for Russian concessions and accountability despite the military balance on the ground. From the Russian perspective presented here, Europe lacks leverage and is disconnected from reality, while Russia sees little reason to negotiate with European leaders at all. The war, the speaker concludes, will continue along this trajectory unless Ukraine and its backers accept Russia’s terms.
Description:
Andrei Martyanov argues that Russia has shifted decisively toward a strategy of breaking Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war, not through rapid territorial advances but by systematically destroying critical infrastructure—especially energy and power generation. Around 70% of Ukraine’s thermal power capacity is described as destroyed, pushing the country toward economic collapse and the risk of humanitarian catastrophe. This escalation is framed as deliberate and long-planned, driven by Russian frustration after years of negotiations that, in their view, Europe rejected.
Militarily, Russia is portrayed as advancing slowly and cautiously on the front lines while applying overwhelming pressure at the strategic and economic level. Russian forces are said to be within roughly 10–11 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia, a major industrial city, but Moscow is deliberately avoiding large, risky breakthroughs. Instead, Russia is conserving forces, building reserves, and operating under an “economy of force” approach, with an eye not only on Ukraine but on potential future confrontation with NATO.
According to the speaker, Russia’s core objective is not territory but the physical destruction of Ukraine’s armed forces and the remnants of its military-industrial complex, including NATO-supplied equipment. The destruction of energy infrastructure is framed as a means to eliminate Ukraine’s war-making capacity rather than simply to punish civilians.
On negotiations, the speaker is emphatic that Russia is not bargaining. Russian goals—demilitarization, “denazification,” no NATO troops, and acceptance of Russian conditions—have not changed since mid-2024. Talks are characterized as ultimatums rather than compromise, with Russian officials signaling “our way or the highway.”
Europe is described as the main obstacle to ending the war, allegedly clinging to unrealistic demands for Russian concessions and accountability despite the military balance on the ground. From the Russian perspective presented here, Europe lacks leverage and is disconnected from reality, while Russia sees little reason to negotiate with European leaders at all. The war, the speaker concludes, will continue along this trajectory unless Ukraine and its backers accept Russia’s terms.
Larry Johnson & Lt Col Daniel Davis | Trump's Art of WARS | Jan. 28, 2026
Labels
Iran,
Israel,
Larry C. Johnson,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
NATO,
Russia,
Trump,
Ukraine
/
Alastair Crooke & Lt Col Daniel Davis | War with Iran Would NOT be Short | Jan. 27, 2026
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Alastair Crooke,
China,
EU,
Iran,
Israel,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
NATO,
Russia,
Trump
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Col. Douglas Macgregor | TRUMP at DAVOS | Jan. 21, 2026
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China,
Colonel Douglas Macgregor,
EU,
Greenland,
Iran,
Israel,
Lt Col Daniel Davis,
NATO,
Russia,
Trump
/
